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Abstract
The possibility that a complex network can be brought
down by attack on a single or very few nodes through the
process of cascading failures is of signiﬁcant concern. In
this paper, we investigate cascading failures in complex
networks and uncover a phase-transition phenomenon in
terms of the key parameter characterizing the node capac-
ity. For parameter value below the phase-transition point,
cascading failures can cause the network to disintegrate
almost entirely. Then we show how to design networks of
ﬁnite capacity that are safe against cascading breakdown.
Our theory yields estimates for the maximally achievable
network integrity via controlled removal of a small set of
low-degree nodes.
Keywords: complex networks, scale-free networks,
power grids, computer networks, degree distribution, cas-
cading breakdown.
1. INTRODUCTION
Complex networks arise in natural systems and they
are also an essential part of modern society. Many
real complex networks, such as the World Wide Web
(WWW), the Internet, and some electrical power grids,
were found to be heterogeneous with power-law degree
distribution [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7] which means that the prob-
ability for a subset of nodes to possess a large number of
links is not exponentially small, in contrast to random net-
works. Because of the ubiquity of scale-free networks in
natural and man-made systems, the security of these net-
works, i.e., how failures or attacks affect the integrity and
operation of the networks, has been of great interest.
In network security study, two main points should be
taken into account: one is architecture of the network; an-
other is dynamics in the network, i.e., how information
or load is distributed in the network. An intuitive reason-
ing based on the load distribution would suggest that, for
a scale-free network, the possibility of breakdown trig-
gered by attack on of even only a single node cannot be
ignored. Imagine such a network that transports some
physical quantities, or load. Nodes with large numbers
of links receive relatively heavier load. Each node, how-
ever, has a ﬁnite capacity to process or transport load. In
order for a node to function properly, its load must be less
than the capacity at all time; otherwise the node fails. If
a node fails, its load will be directed to other nodes, caus-
ing a redistribution of load in the network. If the failing
node deals with a small amount of load, there will be lit-
tle effect on the network because the amount of load that
needs to be redistributed is small. This is typically the
situation of random failure of nodes. However, if the fail-
ing node carries a large amount of load, the consequence
could be serious because this amount of load needs to be
redistributed and it is possible that for some nodes, the
new load exceeds their capacities. These nodes will then
fail, causing further redistributions of load, and so on. As
even only a single node t
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a consequence, a large fraction of the network can be shut-
down.
There have been many studies on cascading failures
in engineering networks (for a brief review, see Sect. 3).
In Ref. [8], a simple mechanism was proposed to incor-
porate the dynamics of load in complex networks. The
model, which is referred to ML model, generates results
that are consistent with the above intuition on cascading
failures. For instance, it was demonstrated that random
networks are robust against cascading breakdown but they
can be easily triggered by intentional attacks in scale-free
networks. The existing results are, however, largely de-
scriptive and qualitative. The purpose of this work is
to address theoretically and numerically the fundamen-
tal mechanism of cascading breakdown. In this work, we
study cascading failures in complex networks with focus
on scale-free networks by using the ML model. Our ﬁnd-
ing is that cascading breakdown in scale-free networks
can be understood in terms of a phase transition. In par-
ticular, let α be the tolerance parameter characterizing the
capacity of nodes in the network. Cascading breakdown
due to attack on a single node is possible only when α
is below a critical value αc. By making use of the de-
gree distribution of scale-free networks and the concept
of betweenness [9] to characterize the load distribution,
we are able to derive a theoretical formula for estimating
the phase-transition point αc, which is veriﬁed by numer-
ical experiments. In terms of practical utility, our result
enables a possible implementation of predicting and pre-
venting mechanism for cascading breakdown in scale-free
networks.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sect.
2, a brief review on complex network models is given. In
Sect. 3, we discuss cascading failure in engineering and
computer networks. Sect. 4 is devoted to analyze cascad-
ing failure in complex networks with focus on scale-free
networks. Sect. 5 is devoted to describe and analyze the
protection mechanism for scale-free networks against cas-
cading breakdown. Finally, Sect. 6 concludes the paper.
2. COMPLEX NETWORK MODELS
In recent years, many complex network models have
been discovered or developed. Here, we brieﬂy review
some some classical models, such as Random Graphs,
Small-World Networks and Scale-Free Networks, and
some newly developed models, such as Layered Networks
and Co-evolution Networks.
The systematic study of random graphs was initiated
by Erdös and Rényi [10]. The term random graph refers to
the disordered nature of the arrangement of links between
different nodes. In their article, Erdös and Rényi proposed
a model to generate random graphs with N nodes and K
links, that we will henceforth call Erdos and Renyi (ER)
Random Graphs. The model for ER random graphs con-
sists in connecting each couple of nodes with a proba-
bility 0 < p < 1. ER random graphs are one of the
best studied among graph models, although they do not
reproduce most of the properties of real networks. The
great discovery of Erdös and Rényi was that many impor-
tant properties of random graphs appear quite suddenly.
That is, at a given probability either almost every graph
has some property Q or, conversely, almost no graph has
it. For many such properties there is a critical probabil-
ity pc(N). If p(N) grows more slowly than pc(N) as
N → ∞, then almost every graph with connection prob-
ability p(N) fails to have Q. If p(N) grows somewhat






0 if p(N)pc(N) → 0
1 if p(N)pc(N) →∞
A few important special cases are:




2. The critical probability of having a cycle of order k
if pc(N) = cN−1;
3. The critical probability of having a complete sub-
graph of order k if pc(N) = cN−
2
k−1 .
Since all the nodes in a random graph are statistically
equivalent, each of them has the same distribution, and
the probability that a node chosen uniformly at random
has degree k has the same form as P (ki = k). For large
N , and ﬁxed average degree 〈k〉, the degree distribution
is well approximated by a Poisson distribution:
P (k) = e−〈k〉
〈k〉k
k!
For this reason, ER graphs are sometimes called Poisson
random graphs. Figure 1 shows the degree distribution of
an ER graph. The network is generated by the method
shown in [11].
Real networks are rarely pure random networks. The
study of several dynamical processes over real networks
has pointed out the existence of shortcuts, i.e. bridging
links that connect different areas of the networks, thus
speeding up the communication among distant nodes,
which is called Small-World effect. The small-world
property in real networks is often associated with the pres-
ence of clustering, denoted by high values of the cluster-
ing coefﬁcient in a network G, deﬁned by
C =
3× number of triangles in G
number of connected triples of vertices in G
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Figure 1. Degree distribution of a random network. The number of
nodes N = 20000 and average degree 〈k〉 = 10.










Figure 2. The average length of shortest paths L and clustering
coefﬁcient C in relation to p. The number of nodes N = 20000 and
average degree 〈k〉 = 4.
For this reason, Watts and Strogatz, in their seminal pa-
per [11], have proposed to deﬁne small-world networks
as those networks having both a small value of average
shortest path length L, like random graphs, and a high
clustering coefﬁcient C, like regular lattices. Clustering,
also known as transitivity, is a typical property of acquain-
tance networks, where two individuals with a common
friend are likely to know each other. Figure 2 shows the
the average length of shortest paths L and clustering coef-
ﬁcient C by randomly changing a fraction p of links start-
ing with a regular network. We see that the small-world
effect occurs when p is small, for example, p = 0.01.
Here, the networks are again generated by the model pre-
sented in [11].
Until a few years ago, network study are focalized on
homogeneous networks. Homogeneity means that almost
all nodes are topologically equivalent, like in regular lat-
tices or in random graphs. In contrast with all the ex-
pectancies, when the scientists approached the study of











Figure 3. Degree distribution of a scale-free network. The number of
nodes N = 20000 and average degree 〈k〉 = 4.
real networks from the available databases, it was found
that most of the real networks were found to be hetero-
geneous with power-law degree distribution [1]: P (k) ∼
k−γ , where k is the number of links of a randomly cho-
sen node in the network and γ is the scaling exponent (see
Fig. 3). The scale-free network is generated by using the
standard Barabási-Albert model [1]. This power-law dis-
tribution means that the probability for a subset of nodes
to possess a large number of links is not exponentially
small, in contrast to random networks. Mathematically,
the power-law distribution means that statistical moments
of the degree variable are generally not deﬁned, hence
the name of Scale-Free Networks. Examples range from
the Internet, WWW, protein-protein interaction networks,
some power grids, telecommunication networks, trafﬁc
ﬂow to social networks [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7])
In the study of scientiﬁc collaboration networks, New-
man [9] found that the degree distribution of such net-
works do not follow a power-law form perfectly. How-
ever, the data are well ﬁtted by a power-law form with an
exponential cutoff:
P (k) ∼ k−τe− kκ
where τ and κ are constants. This form is commonly seen
in physical systems, and implies an underlying degree dis-
tribution which follows a power-law, but with some im-
posed constraint that places a limit on the maximum value
of k. This kind of networks is called Scale-Free with Ex-
ponential Cutoff.
Many complex networks are only a part of larger sys-
tems, where a number of coexisting topologies interact
and depend on each other. In Ref. [12], the authors stud-
ied the load distribution in three transportation systems,
where the lower layer is the physical infrastructure and
the upper layer represents the trafﬁc ﬂows, which is called
Layered Complex Networks. The layered view allow us
to capture different features of the same system. For in-
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stance, the topologies of the Internet at the IP layer, of the
World Wide Web (WWW), or of the networks formed by
peer to peer (P2P) applications. Each WWW or P2P link
virtually connects two IP nodes. These two IP nodes are
usually distant in the underlying IP topology, and the vir-
tual connection is realized as a path found by IP routers.
In other words, the graph formed by an application is
mapped on the underlying IP network.
In Ref. [13], the authors introduced a co-evolution
networks, called TARL Model (for topics, aging, and re-
cursive linking) that simultaneously grows coauthor and
paper citation networks. The statistical and dynamic
properties of the networks generated by this model are
validated against a 20-year data set of articles published
in PNAS. Systematic deviations from a power law distri-
bution of citations to papers are well ﬁt by a model that
incorporates a partitioning of authors and papers into top-
ics, a bias for authors to cite recent papers, and a tendency
for authors to cite papers cited by papers that they have
read.
3. CASCADING FAILURE IN ENGINEER-
ING AND COMPUTER NETWORKS
Cascading failures can occur in many physical sys-
tems. In a power transmission grid, for instance, each
node (a generator) deals with a load of power. Removal of
nodes in general can cause redistribution of loads over all
the network, which can trigger a cascade of overloading
failures. The recent massive power blackout caused by a
series of seemingly unrelated events on August 14, 2003
in the northeastern United States and Canada seemed to
have the characteristics of cascading breakdown.
Many studies have been performed on cascading fail-
ure in power transmission systems. Some recent results
are brieﬂy reviewed here. DeMarco studied cascading
failure due to dynamic transients in bistable systems rep-
resented by nonlinear differential equations [14]. Carreras
et. al. [15] represented cascading failure in a power sys-
tem model using the DC load ﬂow approximation and
standard linear programming optimization of the gener-
ation dispatch. The model shows critical point behavior
as load is increased and can show power tails similar to
those observed in blackout data. Rios et. al. [16] pro-
posed a method based on Monte Carlo simulation can be
enhanced to take into account time-dependent phenom-
ena such a cascade tripping of elements due to overloads,
malfunction of the protection system, and potential power
system instabilities. In [17], the authors proposed risk in-
dices for power systems, referred to online risk-based se-
curity assessment, which provide the ability to compute
online probabilistic risk associated with conditions up to
several hours in the future, as well as monitoring over-
load and cascading overload of networks. In [18], the
authors studied a 15-year time series in the North Amer-
ican power transmission grid. They calculated long time
correlations and probability distribution functions for sev-
eral measurements of blackout size which shows the sand-
pile phenomenon, known as Self-Organized Criticality
(SOC). Dobson et. al. [19] proposed an analytically
tractable model of loading-dependent cascading failure
that captures some of the salient features of large black-
outs of electric power transmission systems. A critical
loading is revealed at which there is a power-law region
in the distribution of number of components failed and
a sharp increase in the gradient of the mean number of
components failed.
Another example of cascading failure is the Internet,
where the load represents data packets a node (router) is
requested to transmit and overloading corresponds to con-
gestion [20]. The rerouting of data packets from a con-
gested router to another may spread the congestion to a
large fraction of the network. With the possibility of cas-
cading failures, a realistic concern is attacks on complex
networks. In particular, for a scale-free network, major-
ity of the nodes deal with small amount of load, so the
probability for a node with a large amount of load to fail
randomly is small. This, of course, will not be the case
of intentional attacks that usually target one or a few of
the most heavily linked nodes. The work by Albert et
al. [21] demonstrated that scale-free networks possess
the robust-yet-fragile property, in the sense that they are
robust against random failures of nodes but fragile to in-
tentional attacks. Cohen et. al. [22, 23] studied inter-
net breakdown by random failure and intentional attack.
In their works, a scale-free network can become disinte-
grated under attacks on a small but still appreciable set
of nodes that include a substantial fraction of links in the
network. Attack on a single or very few nodes will in
general not bring down the network. This result was ac-
tually obtained based purely on the scale-free architecture
of the network. In other words, dynamics in the network,
i.e., how information or load is distributed in the network,
was not taken into account.
According to Dobson et. al. [19], cascading process
in power grids consists of the following essential com-
ponents: components that fail when their load exceeds
a threshold, an initial disturbance loading of the system,
and the additional loading of components by the failure of
other components. In the ML model [8], the load dynamic
is represented by betweenness of the node (total number
of shortest paths passing through the node). In fact, sev-
eral papers have used betweenness as a measure for the
vertex load in dynamical communications systems (see,
for example, [25]). When an attack or random failure oc-
curs, some nodes are removed from the network. This
effect can cause redistribution of loads over all the net-
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work and it is possible that for some nodes, the new load
exceeds their designed capacities. These nodes will then
fail, causing further redistributions of load, and so on. As
a consequence, a large fraction of the network can be shut-
down, a cascade of overloading failures. One can see that
the ML model captures the essential components of cas-
cading process. Moreover, it takes into account the net-
work architecture by means of betweenness, which allow
us to study cascading failure in different network topol-
ogy (such as scale-free networks) and by different origins
(attack or random failure). This is an important feature
since many real networks, including the Internet, WWW
and some power grids are scale-free networks.
4. CASCADING FAILURE IN THE ML
MODEL
In the ML model [8, 26, 27, 28], the load (or between-
ness) at a node i is deﬁned as the total number of shortest
paths passing through this node. The capacity of a node
is the maximum load that the node can handle. In man-
made networks, the capacity is severely limited by cost.
Thus, it is natural to assume that the capacity Ci of node
i is proportional to its initial load Li(0),
Ci = (1 + α)Li(0) = λLi(0), (1)
where the constant α ≥ 0 (or λ ≥ 1) is the tolerance pa-
rameter, i is the node index, and (0) represents the process
is at time 0 (before attack).
Speciﬁcally, the cascading process can be described
by the algorithm shown by Fig. 4. When all nodes are on,
the network operates in a free ﬂow state insofar as α ≥ 0.
But, the removal of nodes in general changes the distribu-
tion of shortest paths. The load at a particular node can
then change. If it increases and becomes larger than the
capacity, the node fails. Any failure leads to a new dis-
tribution of load and, as a result, subsequent failures can
occur. The failures can stop without affecting too much
the connectivity of the network but they can also propa-
gate and shutdown a considerable fraction of the whole
network.
Cascading failures can be conveniently quantiﬁed by





where N and N ′ are the numbers of nodes in the largest
component before and after the cascade, respectively.
Thus, we have 0 ≤ G ≤ 1. The integrity of the network
is maintained if G ≈ 1, while breakdown (cascading fail-
ure) occurs if G ≈ 0. If G is far from both 0 and 1, the
phenomenon is referred to partial failure.
To gain a qualitative view of cascading failure, we ﬁrst
provide some computer simulation results. We generate
Figure 4. Algorithmic description of cascading process in the ML
model.
scale-free networks by using the standard Barabási-Albert
model [1]. The shortest paths and the load Li are com-
puted by using the algorithm developed by Newman [29].
Figure 5 shows G versus both α and Ntrigger for scale-
free networks under attack, where Ntrigger represents the
number of nodes that an attack targets. Here the removed
nodes are those with the highest numbers of links. Note
that the number of targeted nodes, while more than one, is
still far small compared with the total number of nodes in
the network. Practically, this means that, even if the net-
work is designed to have a high tolerance by stipulating
high capacities for its nodes, cascading failures triggered
by attack on a very small subset of nodes are capable of
bringing down the entire network. Partial failures can be
observed too in the ﬁgure. Figure 6 shows G versus both
α and Ntrigger for random networks under attack. Due to
the less of hubs (nodes with large number of links), ran-
dom networks can be disintegrated only when α is small
or (and) Ntrigger is large. Thus, cascading process un-
der attack can bring much more serious consequence for
scale-free networks than for random networks.
Figure 7 shows the random failure case for scale-free
networks. Random failure means that m randomly se-
lected nodes are removed from the network at the be-
ginning of cascading process. In a scale-free network, a
small portion of nodes has high degree, while a large por-
tion of nodes has low degree. Thus, with high probability,
a randomly selected node is low degree, usually having
a low value of betweenness. Intuitively, there will be lit-
tle effect on the network because the amount of load that
needs to be redistributed is small. This point is conﬁrmed
by the simulation result shown by Fig. 7 where G ∼ 1
even if α is small and Ntrigger is large.
To obtain an analytic estimate of the critical value of
the tolerance parameter, we focus on scale-free networks
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Figure 5. For a scale-free network of N = 2000 nodes under attack
targeting multiple nodes, G versus α and Ntrigger , the number of






















Figure 6. For a random network of N = 2000 nodes under attack
targeting multiple nodes, G versus α and Ntrigger . For each




















Figure 7. For a scale-free network of N = 2000 nodes under random
failure, G versus α and Ntrigger . For each parameter value, G is
averaged over 20 realizations.
and the situation where cascading failures are caused by
attack on the node with the largest number of links and
the failures lead to immediate breakdown of the network.
That is, G becomes close to zero after one redistribution
of the load. For a node in the network, its load is a func-
tion of the degree variable k. For scale-free networks, we
have [26],
L(k) ∼ kη, (3)
where η > 0 is a scaling exponent. To proceed, we write
the degree distribution as P (k) = ak−γ and the load dis-
tribution as L(k) = bkη, where a and b are positive con-
stants. Let kmax be the largest degree in the network.
Before the attack, we have∫ kmax
1
P (k)dk = N and (4)
∫ kmax
1
P (k)L(k)dk = S,









where β ≡ γ − η − 1. After the removal of the high-
est degree node (it is only the ﬁrst step of the whole
cascading process), the degree and load distributions be-
come P ′(k) = a′k−γ
′
and L′(k) = b′kη
′
, respectively.
Since only a small fraction of nodes are removed from
the network, we expect the changes in the algebraic scal-
ing exponents of these distributions to be negligible. We
thus write P ′(k) ≈ a′k−γ and L′(k) ≈ b′kη, where the
proportional constants a′ and b′ can be calculated in the
same way as for a and b. We obtain a′ = (1 − γ)(N −
1)/[k1−γmax − 1] and b′ = βS′/a′(1 − kmax)−β , where S′
is the total load of the network after the attack. For nodes
with k links, the difference in load before and after the
attack can be written as ΔL(k) ≈ (b′ − b)kη = ( b′b −
1)L(k). Given the capacity C(k), the maximum load in-
crease that the nodes can handle is C(k)−L(k) = αL(k).
The nodes still function if α > ( b
′
b − 1) but they fail if
α < ( b
′
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where the ﬁnal result is obtained by using the fact
(kmax′1−γ − 1)/(kmax1−γ − 1) ≈ 1. This is so be-
cause both kmax′1−γ and kmax′1−γ approach zero when
N → ∞ and γ > 1. In the limit N → ∞, we have
k−βmax′ ∼ 0, kmax/kmax′ ∼ constant, and S′/S → 1,
so αc ≈ 0, indicating that an inﬁnite scale-free network
cannot be brought down by a single attack if α > 0. On
the other hand, for ﬁnite size network, since k−βmax′ > 0,
we have αc > 0, suggesting that breakdown can occur
for α < αc. The practical usage of Eq. (6) is that it
provides a way to monitor the state of (ﬁnite) network to
assess the risk of cascading breakdown. In particular, the
critical value αc can be computed in time and comparison
with the pre-designed tolerance parameter value α can be
made. If αc shows a tendency of increase and approaches
α, early warning can be issued to signal an immediate
danger of network breakdown.
We now provide numerical support for the theoretical
prediction Eq. (6). Figure 8(a) shows cascading failures
when a single node with different degree is removed from
the network. We see that, when a node with small de-
gree is removed, the G value remains close to one except
when α is close to zero. However, when the node with
the largest degree (in this case k = 81) is removed, nearly
total breakdown of the network, as represented by values
of G close to zero, occurs when α < 0.1. The phase-
transition point αc is thus about 0.1. With numerical val-
ues of kmax = 81, k′max = 60, S ≈ 1.86 × 107 and
S′ ≈ 1.91 × 107, theoretically predicted value of αc in
Eq. (6) gives αc ≈ 0.1, which is consistent with numer-
ics. This phase transition phenomenon seems to be robust
for different sizes of network, as shown in Fig. 8(b), G
versus α for N = 1000, N = 2000 and N = 5000,
respectively.
5. PROTECTING SCALE-FREE NET-
WORKS FROM CASCADING FAILURE
In this section, we study quantitatively a mechanism
of protection against cascading breakdown proposed in
[27]. The method consists in removing a small set of
nodes that contribute to the loads in the network but they
themselves otherwise process little load. Removal of
these nodes and all links connected to them will not af-
fect the functioning of the network but will help enhance
the load tolerance for each remaining node, thereby help-
ing prevent the spread of the failure or cascading.
For a scale-free network, its load distribution obeys
algebraic scaling with the degree variable k [26]: L(k) =
bkη, where η and b are positive constants. After removing
a small fraction of low-degree nodes, the average con-
nectivity of the network changes little. Moreover, the
degree distribution remains to be algebraic with approx-
































Figure 8. Cascading failure in scale-free network in relation to the
tolerance parameter α. (a) Removal of the nodes with different number
of links for N = 2000. In the case of the removal of the node with the
highest degree, the phase-transition point is αc ≈ 0.1, meaning that for
α < αc, the networks disintegrate almost entirely under intentional
attack on a single node. (b) Phase transitions for networks of different
sizes. The resulting data points were averaged over 30 realizations.
imately the same scaling exponent, which can be seen,
as follows. On average, the load reduction due to the re-
moval of a low-degree node is proportional to its origi-
nal load. Let L(k1) and L(k2) be the average loads on
nodes of degree k1 and k2, respectively. After the re-
moval, the average loads are L′(k′1) = L(k1) − c1L(k1)
and L′(k′2) = L(k2) − c2L(k2), respectively, where k′1
and k′2 are the new degrees. Since c1 ≈ c2, we have
L′(k′1)/L
′(k′2) ≈ L(k1)/L(k2). Thus, the algebraic scal-
ing exponent after the removal assumes approximately the
same value as in the original network: η′ ≈ η, the net-
work remains scale-free, and the load distribution can be
written as L′(k) = b′kη
′ ≈ b′kη. This property has been
conﬁrmed by our numerical simulations (to be shown be-
low).
We can now determine the relation between the load
distributions before and after removing ρ percent of low-
degree nodes. For convenience, all nodes in the net-
work are labeled by integers from 1 to N , while the re-
moved nodes are labeled by (1 − ρ)N + 1 to N . The
total load before the removal can be written as S =∑(1−ρ)N
i=1 Li +
∑N
i=N(1−ρ)+1 Li ≡ S0 + S1, where S0
is the sum of loads of the remaining nodes before the
removal and S1 is the total load of the removed nodes.
Because the removed nodes have relatively low degrees,
we have S0  S1 and, hence, S ≈ S0 =
∑N(1−ρ)
i=1 Li.





i=1 σLi, where 0 < σ < 1 is a
shifting constant. Since S = N(N − 1)D ≈ N2D,
S′ = N(1 − ρ)[N(1 − ρ) − 1]D′ ≈ (1 − ρ)2N2D′ and
D ≈ D′, where D and D′ are the diameters of the net-
works before and after the removal, respectively, we have
σ ≈ (1− ρ)2 ≈ 1− 2ρ. Thus, on average, the difference
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Figure 9. (a) Algebraic scaling of the load distribution L(k) for a
scale-free network of N = 10000 nodes, γ = 3, and 〈k〉 = 4. (b-e)
Load distributions after removing 1%, 5%, 10%, and 20% of the
lowest-degree nodes. (f) Rescaled plots of all curves in (a-e). The
algebraic scaling exponent is η ≈ 1.5.
between the loads of node i before and after the removal
is ΔLi = Li − L′i ≈ 2ρLi, which is independent of the
parameter λ. Since, initially, the load tolerance of node i
is (λ − 1)Li and the process of removal results in equiv-
alently an extra amount of load tolerance 2ρLi, the node
will not fail unless the load increment due to an attack ex-
ceeds (λ − 1 + 2ρ)Li. Controlled removal of ρ percent
of low-degree nodes is thus equivalent to increasing the
parameter λ to λ + 2ρ in the original network:
λ′ ≈ λ + 2ρ. (7)
We now present numerical support for our theoretical
result Eq. (7). Again, we generate scale-free networks
with degree exponent γ = 3 and average connectivity
〈k〉 = 4 by using the standard Barabási-Albert model.
Figure 9(a) shows the algebraic scaling of the load distri-
bution of the network without any removal of nodes. Ap-
proximately the same scaling behavior is observed when
some small fractions of nodes with the lowest degrees are
removed, as shown in Figs. 9(b-e) for ρ = 1%, 5%, 10%,
and 20%, respectively. That the intentional removal of a
small set of nodes does not change the algebraic load dis-
tribution can be seen more clearly in Fig. 9(f), where all
plots in Figs. 9(a-e), rescaled by some proper constants,
apparently collapse into a single curve. In particular, the
algebraic scaling exponent η remains approximately the
same, regardless of the value of ρ.
Figure 10(a) shows G(λ, ρ) versus λ for different val-
ues of ρ, where an attack on the node with the largest
degree is assumed. In all cases, there exists a critical ca-
pacity λc below which the network breaks down entirely
as a result of the attack. This value becomes smaller as ρ
is increased from zero (curves shifts toward the left), in-
dicating that for some ﬁxed value λ > λc, the network
is more robust against cascading breakdown due to the



























Figure 10. For a scale-free network with N = 3000, (a) G(λ, ρ)
versus λ for ﬁve different values of ρ and (b) properly rescaled plots
that exhibit a universal relation.
attack. This clearly illustrates the protective role played
by selectively removing a small set of low-degree nodes.
Figure 10(b) shows that the relation between the rescaled
quantities G(λ, ρ)/(1 − ρ) and λ + 2ρ is independent of
the value of ρ, as predicted.
6. CONCLUSIONS
We investigated cascading failures triggered by at-
tacks on a single or a few nodes in scale-free networks
and focused on the fundamental and practically important
question of whether such failures can lead to disintegra-
tion of the network. Our ﬁnding is a phase-transition like
phenomenon in terms of the network tolerance parameter
characterizing the node capacity, where the two distinct
phases correspond to the situations where the network un-
der attack remains largely integrated or disintegrated as a
result of cascading failures.
By analyzing the dynamics of load redistribution re-
sulted from selectively removing a small set of low-
degree nodes, we obtained a criterion which allows the
lower bound of the capacity parameter for cascade-free
scale-free networks and the optimal fraction of intention-
ally removed nodes to be determined.
The model we study here not only captures the es-
sential components of cascading process, but also in-
corporates network topology by means of betweenness.
Thus, the understanding of the model certainly has pos-
itive meaning for engineering and computer network de-
sign and protection.
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